Supreme Court of the United States: Hurst v. Florida ruling

8 HURST v. FLORIDA

Opinion of the Court
missions” made Hurst eligible for the death penalty. Brief for Respondent 42–44.
Blakely, however, was a decision applying Apprendi to facts admitted in a guilty plea, in which the defendant necessarily waived his right to a jury trial. See 542 U. S., at 310–312. Florida has not explained how Hurst’s alleged admissions accomplished a similar waiver. Florida’s argument is also meritless on its own terms. Hurst never admitted to either aggravating circumstance alleged by the State. At most, his counsel simply refrained from challenging the aggravating circumstances in parts of his appellate briefs. See, e.g., Initial Brief for Appellant in No. SC12–1947 (Fla.), p. 24 (“not challeng[ing] the trial court’s findings” but arguing that death was nevertheless a disproportionate punishment).
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The State next argues that stare decisis compels us to uphold Florida’s capital sentencing scheme. As the Florida Supreme Court observed, this Court “repeatedly has reviewed and upheld Florida’s capital sentencing statute over the past quarter of a century.” Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693, 695 (2002) (per curiam) (citing Hildwin, 490
U. S. 638; Spaziano, 468 U. S. 447). “In a comparable situation,” the Florida court reasoned, “the United States Supreme Court held:
‘If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other courts] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” Bottoson, 833 So. 2d, at 695 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989)); see also 147 So. 3d, at 446–447 (case below).

Tags: Government/Politics & Law